Carleton’s Canadian Defence and Security Network Sparks Strengthened Relationships and Engagement
Joseph Mathieu, August 9, 2019
Photo credit: Luther Caverly
When Stephen Saideman interviewed to join the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA) eight years ago, he proposed a research network for Canadian defence and security.
That was 2011. The following year, he joined the NPSIA as a professor and as the Norman Paterson Chair in International Affairs. In 2019, his network proposal became reality and Saideman became director of the Canadian Defence and Security Network (CDSN).
“Our network is aimed at both addressing the problems of today and building connections for the long term,” he says. “For the short term, this network is important because there are so many divides between Canadian entities that should be collaborating.”
“A lot of assumptions about how the world works are up for grabs right now,” said Saideman in a news release about the launch of the network. “The government is consumed by the day-to-day, but we as academics have longer time horizons so we can help think beyond tomorrow.”
Officially launched last May, the CDSN was designed to strengthen relationships between Canada’s academic institutions, military organizations, government departments, and citizens through a variety of projects.
In July, the network received a $2.5-million partnership grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) to support those goals.
It offers training for the next generation of scholars, policy officers, and military officers with an emphasis on diversity and inclusion. It informs the public and aims to improve the average Canadian’s defence and security literacy through workshops, reports, and the podcast Battle Rhythm.
It also connects research institutes with government and military bodies to increase collaboration.
Operating out of NPSIA, the network gives policy makers access to expert perspectives and solutions, and gives researchers the chance to anticipate the next big issues that the Canadian government and military will face.
In a rapidly changing world, they are already facing many such issues.
Worrisome global trends—such as the rise of extreme nationalism, missile weapons tests, Arctic sovereignty claims, and trade wars—have changed how Canada fits (and sees itself) on the world stage.
A signed photo of the U.S. Pentagon hangs on Steve Saideman’s office wall.
“One assumption was that the United States would be the primary protector of the rules-based order,” says Saideman. “With Donald Trump in power, not so much. So the question now is whether other countries can supplement or supplant the U.S. effort.”
Canada is also facing new challenges in its relations with countries such as China, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and even the United States.
“Canada’s situation is more uncertain than any other time in recent history, and uncertainty tends to breed mistakes,” says Saideman. “Our hope is that we will provide some guidance for how to navigate these situations, avoiding unnecessary conflict.”
On top of training and public engagement, the CDSN also focuses on the distinct research themes of procurement, military personnel, operations, security, and civil-military relations. These themes were based on the budget for the Department of National Defence (DND) and the political issues of the day.
Adapting in the Dust: Lessons Learned from Canada’s War in Afghanistan by Stephen M. Saideman
In 2017, the Liberal government released the Canada Defence Strategy to replace the previous Conservative government’s strategy from 2008. The Harper strategy set out a 20-year budget plan for the DND, while the Trudeau strategy mapped out the department’s next 10 years.
According to the CDSN, defence strategy reviews should happen more regularly. The enlisted help of academia can help in this task.
“There is a lot of wasted effort, repetition, and frustration because we don’t know each other and we don’t build on each other’s work,” says Saideman.
The SSHRC grant will receive matching contributions from the CDSN’s partners. This will allow the network to spread even further: across the globe with foreign government agencies, armed forces, and research centres.
The network currently has over 30 partners and 100 academics in Canada and abroad. There are those involved in research (who generate, disseminate, or consume it) and in capacity-building (“those who have a mission to help others reach their ambitions,” says Saideman).
The latter partners include organizations like Bridging the Gap, Women in International Security-Canada, and the Defence and Security Innovation Hub.
Saideman calls the network a “dynamic and evolving space.” There are research generators from Canada—such as the Queen’s University’s Centre for International and Defence Policy, the Canadian Forces College’s Center for National Security Studies, and the University of Calgary’s Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies—and from abroad—including the Center for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark and the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute.
The network is for research disseminators—such as Open Canada, the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, and the NATO Association of Canada—as much as it is for those who consume research, like the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command and the NATO Defence College.
Saideman says the network’s efforts have received much enthusiasm from several DND agencies, including the office of the Chief of the Defence Staff, who commands the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF).
“The CAF understands that they benefit from more engagement with academics and civil society,” he says. “They are happy that we are working to build these connections… We have had open doors wherever we have gone.”
Canadian, U.S. military leaders agree on framework to retool Norad
Defence command deal comes as new threats emerge from ballistic and advanced cruise missiles
Murray Brewster · CBC News · Posted: Aug 08, 2019 7:23 PM ET | Last Updated: August 8
Military leaders from the U.S. and Canada have come to an agreement on the nuts and bolts retooling of Norad, CBC News has learned.
It is a milestone that could end up pitting the next government in Ottawa against both the Trump administration and perhaps even northern Indigenous communities at home.
Now over six decades old, the bi-national air and maritime defence command — and its associated airfields, radar stations and satellite network — has been in need of a major overhaul in the face of emerging threats, such as North Korean ballistic missiles and rapidly advancing cruise missile technology.
Word of the understanding comes as two Canadian CF-18s and two American F-22 Raptors intercepted two Russian Tu-95 Bear bombers, which pressed close to North American airspace, on Thursday.
The agreement of "what's in and what's out" of the new North American Aerospace Defence Command was struck a few months ago, said a defence source in Ottawa, who was granted anonymity because of the sensitivity of the subject.
Separately, the Canadian general who is the deputy commander of Norad confirmed the two countries are on the same page when it comes to the new framework needed to defend the continent, but cautioned there is still a lot of work and negotiation ahead over capabilities and what is affordable.
A CF-18 fighter reflects the setting sun while flying a mission over Bosnia in February 1999. Similar jets and two American F-22 Raptors intercepted a pair of Russian bombers close to North American airspace on Thursday.(Reuters)
"We have established the operational requirements," Lt.-Gen. Christopher Coates in an interview with CBC News.
A bi-national panel is examining the specifications and make recommendations to both the Pentagon and the Department of National Defence in Ottawa.
Eventually, Coates said, each government will have to "determine whether or not those capabilities will be provided — or some other option" will be pursued.
And that is where things could potentially get messy, according to defence experts.
James Fergusson, of the University of Manitoba, one of the pre-eminent researchers on Norad, said the price tag will be substantial.
Replacing the North Warning System chain of radar stations, alone, could cost as much as $11 billion, he said.
The Liberal government has made much of saying its defence plans are fully costed, but it deliberately did not include the calculation for Norad modernization in its policy.
There will have to be some negotiation with Washington, even though the cost sharing formula (60-40 split between the U.S. and Canada) has long been established.
A man watches a TV news program showing a file footage of the missile launch conducted by North Korea in June 2018. The Pyongyang's missile tests are among the emerging threats facing Norad. (Ahn Young-joon/Associated Press)
Steve Saideman, a professor of international affairs at Carleton University in Ottawa, said he can't see any Canadian government being anxious to open negotiations with the Trump administration, regardless of how long standing the arrangements might be.
U.S. President Donald Trump has long complained American allies do not pay their fair share of costs for the NATO alliance, and Saideman said it is not beyond the realm of possibility that government-to-government technical negotiations over Norad could devolve.
Fergusson disagreed.
If they argue over money, he said, it will likely involve environmental cleanup costs related to the existing, remote north warning radar stations.
When Norad abandoned its first chain of early warning sites — known as the DEW line — in 1993, the cleanup took 21 years and Canada was stuck with the $575 million bill.
Norad's DEW Line system of early warning radar sites was abandoned in 1993. (CBC)
More problematic, as far as Fergusson is concerned, is whether Norad's proposed new capabilities will affect northern indigenous communities, which — unlike the past — will rightfully expect to be consulted and have a say over what the military does with the land.
"When they [the Canadian and U.S. military] go up there in Northern Canada, now, they can't simply ignore the Indigenous people," said Fergusson, "And that's a political issue."
CBC News reached out to four northern Indigenous groups this week to ask about their potential concerns. All declined to comment.
Military officials would not say precisely what capabilities they are proposing, but among the biggest open question is whether a re-equipped Norad will mean an end to Canada's long-standing prohibition on participating in ballistic missile defence. Gen. John Hyten, who has been nominated to be vice chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, told his confirmation hearing on July 30 that U.S. cannot do missile defence alone anywhere in the world.
"Missile defence needs to be an international capability," Hyten testified.
"We need to be able to partner with our allies in terms of how we defend ourselves, too."
The Liberal government's defence policy was explicit, saying Canada would not change course on missile defence, but dramatic nuclear and rocket tests by the rogue regime in North Korea have prompted both the House of Commons and the Senate defence committees to recommend a change of heart.
Call for Papers “Commander, Tactician, Technician: The Evolution of Army Leadership, 1850-2050”
The Annual Conference of the Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society and The Canadian Army Combat Training Centre
February 5-6, 2020
Wu Conference Centre, University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada
Our February 2020 conference will focus on the evolution of armed forces leadership in the modern world among officers and non-commissioned officers, particularly in ground force sub-units. Effective leadership has long been identified as a decisive ingredient to military success. Today, leadership development, training and education constitute a significant investment for the Canadian Armed Forces. Our 2020 conference will open by considering historical, social, and technological changes that created the modern Canadian Army leadership system to set the scene for discussions about the current state of practice. Panelists and participants will also weigh new ideas about leadership to meet the challenge of a rapidly shifting and uncertain future. This annual conference brings together instructor staff from the Canadian Army’s Combat Training Centre combat arms and combat service support schools, Base Gagetown lodger units, reservists, police, civilian practitioners, academics and students to discuss issues that matter to Canadian Army readiness and national security. The CTC delivers training for commissioned and non-commissioned members at the junior and midlevels, making this conference an excellent opportunity to disseminate ideas, and promote discussion and intellectual readiness across the entire Canadian Army community. Selected papers may be published. The Gregg Centre and the Combat Training Centre invite scholars and practitioners to submit paper or panel proposals for our annual conference.
Please submit inquiries or proposals and a short curriculum vitae to the Gregg Centre-CTC Conference Committee c/o Prof. Lee Windsor at: lwindsor@unb.ca
Topics this year include but are not limited to:
The evolution of roles for officers and non-commissioned officers.
Leadership at the sub-unit level
Decentralization of leadership
Industrial, technological, social and economic change
Preparing leaders among citizen armies in two world wars
Post-Cold War transition to large peacetime regular armies
The 1990s era of high tempo and institutional change.
The Afghanistan era 2001-2014
Perspectives from Allied armies
Educating and training leaders
SOF vs Green Army leadership
Leadership in mechanized and hightech operations
Leadership on full-spectrum operations
The “Strategic Corporal/Sergeant” revisited
Balancing discipline, mentorship, coaching, trust, and cohesion
Increasing responsibilities and information flow in the digital age.
Ethical leadership
The CDAI is hiring
One of our network partners, the CDA Institute is hiring for two positions:
1) Research Communications Coordinator
The position is a part-time, out-of-office contract. Depending on performance and availability of resources, the contract may be amended to a full-time, on-site permanent position.
Primary Responsibilities
Design infographics for communicating the most up-to-date defence and security research to the greater public in cooperation with affiliated researchers and the executive director.
Design and carry out online strategies for communicating the most up-to-date defence and security research to the greater public in cooperation with affiliated researchers and the executive director.
Develop social media and web content & coordinate with Operations Coordinator for publishing.
Secondary Responsiblities
Coordinate affiliated researchers (fellows and research clusters) in cooperation with the CDA Institute Associate Editors.
Facilitate peer-review processes in cooperation with the CDA Institute Associate Editors.
Write occasional press releases & media advisories in cooperation with the Executive Director.
Required Skills
Excellent English language writing skills
Experience with and access to design software (i.e. Adobe Create Suite or other) – a portfolio may be asked.
University education in a pertinent field: fine arts, design, communications, political science, economics, security studies, international relations, sociology, etc.
Demonstration of a multifaceted skill set: i.e. candidates with a fine arts and design background will be asked to demonstrate their interest and knowledge world politics / candidates with arts and science background will be tested on their design and communications skills
Additional Assets
Excellent French language skills
Creativity, direction, ambition, and the ability to deliver with little supervision
Salary commensurate with experience.
Please submit a short letter of intent and a copy of your CV to hr@cdainstitute.ca no later than August 15, 2019.
2) Research Assistant in Defence Economics & Procurement.
The position is a part-time, out-of-office contract. Depending on performance and availability of resources, the contract may be amended to a full-time, on-site permanent “Researcher” position.
Primary Responsibilities
Carry out research in the field of defence economics and procurement in cooperation with affiliated researchers and the executive director.
Work alongside the Research Communications Coordinator to design infographics and carry out online strategies for communicating defence and security research to the greater public.
Secondary Responsiblities
Coordinate affiliated researchers (fellows and research clusters) in cooperation with the CDA Institute Associate Editors
Facilitate peer-review processes in cooperation with the CDA Institute Associate Editors
Write occasional press releases & media advisories
Required Skills
Excellent English language writing skills
Graduate level education in economics or public administration
Additional Assets
Familiarity with defence procurement policies in other countries for comparative analysis
Excellent French language skills
Creativity, direction, ambition, and the ability to deliver with little supervision
Salary commensurate with experience.
Please submit a short letter of intent and a copy of your CV to hr@cdainstitute.ca no later than August 15, 2019.
Carleton Researcher Receives Funding to Support Security and Defence Network
Carleton University Prof. Stephen Saideman has received a $2.5 million Partnership Grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) for his work on the Canadian Defence and Security Network (CDSN) to create an inclusive and innovative defence and security community in Canada.
“Carleton researchers continue to produce cutting-edge research in public safety and security with SSHRC support,” said Rafik Goubran, vice-president (Research and International). “This generous funding is a vital addition to our already substantial research in this area which will lead to a safer Canada and ultimately a safer global community.”
At a time of rapid change on the world stage, Canada is facing new challenges in its relations with countries such as China, Saudi Arabia, and even the United States.
That prompted Saideman, at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA), to create the network, which was officially launched May 24, 2019. The grant, with matching contributions from more than 30 partners, will allow the CDSN to connect across the globe with government agencies, the armed forces and civil society.
“The idea is to bring together people who are studying or working in defence and security throughout Canada to build a community,” says Saideman, who holds the Paterson Chair in International Affairs. “This is a big country and there are a lot of divides between academia, civil society and the military across the country. We want to have more interaction so we can anticipate the research interests of the government and the military.”
The centre will focus on five research themes, including defence procurement, military personnel, operations, security, and civil-military relations. Each theme will have a joint academic/government/civil society/defence team associated with it, assessing what Canada does well and what it does poorly on the defence and security front.
“A lot of assumptions about how the world works are up for grabs right now,” says Saideman. “The government is consumed by the day to day, but we as academics have longer time horizons so we can help think beyond tomorrow.”
In addition to research projects, the network is also focused on outreach. It’s planning a summer training institute for military officers and policy officials, an online portal for Canada’s international relations, a podcast, workshops, an annual conference, internships and exchanges, along with a social and traditional media plan.
The CDSN also hopes to advance knowledge of Canadian defence and security studies, adapting research initiatives to inform policy-making. It will improve cross-sector information and data sharing while improving the defence and security literacy of Canadians.
Source: Carleton Newsroom
KCIS 2019: Keynote Recap
By Bibi Imre-Millei, CIDP Intern
This year, the annual Kingston Conference on International Security (KCIS) focussed on the international order: whether it might change, and where that might lead world politics and security. The liberal international order led by the United States is being challenged not only by states such as Russia and China, but by new ideas, new capabilities, and new perspectives. KCIS set out to address the changes and challenges, and the variety of possible paths moving forward in this changing order. In this post, we focus on the keynotes of KCIS. We outline the insights from the speakers, and the corresponding conversations on Twitter!
Book Release: Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice
© 2020
Editors: Juneau, Thomas, Lagassé, Philippe, Vucetic, Srdjan (Eds.)
This edited volume provides a comprehensive overview of contemporary debates and issues in Canadian defence policy studies. The contributors examine topics including the development of Canadian defence policy and strategic culture, North American defence cooperation, gender and diversity in the Canadian military, and defence procurement and the defence industrial base. Emphasizing the process of defence policy-making, rather than just the outcomes of that process, the book focuses on how political and organizational interests impact planning, as well as the standard operating procedures that shape Canadian defence policy and practices.
Defending Canadian sovereignty : new threats, new challenges
Issued also in French under title: Défendre la souveraineté du Canada : nouvelles menaces, nouveaux défis.
Includes bibliographical references.
In 2016, Dr. Pierre-Gerlier Forest, director of the School of Public Policy at the University of Calgary, Tom Jenkins, chairman of the board of OpenText, and Lieutenant-General Michael J. Hood, then Commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), met informally in Calgary at the margins of an official event. As the conversation unfolded, they all expressed some disappointment with the state of the public debate on matters related to Canadian sovereignty. From their respective points of views—academia, private sector, and military—Canadians were, in general, indifferent to the evolving nature of state sovereignty and, as a corollary, to the mounting political, economic, social, and military difficulties faced by Canada in a transitioning world. From military procurement projects, such as the replacement of the CF18 aircraft or the renewal of the Royal Canadian Navy main assets, to increasing Russian military assertiveness in Eastern Europe and Canadian airspace, or current foreign intrusions in our political debate through cyberspace, indigenous relations with the Crown, or even the impact of climate change, especially in the Arctic, there is no shortage of challenges. Nevertheless, there has been a general unwillingness on the part of academics, political elites, civil servants, and journalists to revisit and question accepted notions of sovereignty as they apply to Canada in the 21st century. Convinced by the urgency of the matter, the three leaders agreed to join their efforts and to hold a series of events in the hope of initiating a national conversation on the issue of Canadian sovereignty. The present project emerged from this intersectoral concern. The group organized three roundtables across Canada to culminate in Ottawa during the RCAF’s annual meeting in the spring of 2017. First, on March 27, a conference was organized at the University of Calgary on the theme of economic sovereignty. This event brought together scholars, policymakers, and federal and provincial civil servants to examine the specific challenges and opportunities faced by Canada in the economic realm. A second event was organized on March 31 by Massey College at the University of Toronto, on the theme of technological sovereignty. Participants investigated how the rapidly evolving digitalization and automatization of our societies eroded states’ capacity to control and promote policies. A third conference was organized on April 13 at Université Laval on the theme of territorial sovereignty, with a particular focus on the Arctic region. Finally, in May 2017, a select panel from these events was invited by the RCAF to their annual symposium on air power, where members of academia, military institutions, and the private sector discussed Canadian sovereignty from an interdisciplinary point of view, encompassing political, economic, social, legal, and military approaches in an effort to recognize the multidimensionality of the Canadian sovereignty debate. This book is the final outcome emerging from the initial Forest-Jenkins-Hood impromptu conversation. It gave way to what has now been a two-year analysis on Canadian sovereignty. It speaks of the commitment of the initial organizers to use their institutions to promote a national conversation that would acknowledge the genuinely complex nature of the concept of sovereignty and the particular challenges that all sectors of the Canadian society face in this respect. The book follows a logical arc where each successive chapter ties different aspects of the Canadian sovereignty debate. We begin with addressing the inherent civil-military dimensions of sovereignty with three chapters. In the first chapter, General Thomas J. Lawson (Retired) offers an insightful reflection on the challenges associated with protecting Canadian sovereignty. One major concern, from the author’s perspective, is the potential for Canadians to become complacent in asserting and defending our sovereignty in the context of a global environment in transition. In this respect, the author considers the issue from the perspective of a senior military decision maker who has the responsibility to put into “practice” the establishment and actualization of Canadian sovereignty. The chapter thus explores particular challenges facing Canadian military leaders, such as the necessary intersection between political direction, which is often wide-ranging and elusive, and policy elaboration and implementation by DND: operating in Canada’s difficult geography; coordinating with Canadian allies; asserting sovereignty in a multi-domain environment in flux, especially with respect to intelligence, cyber warfare, and space; and procurement. In Chapter 2, Jean-Christophe Boucher focuses on Canadian political elites and examines how politicians have framed sovereignty issues during House of Commons debates since 2001. Using machine learning, the author effectively measures political narrative on Canadian sovereignty and identifies two competing “visions.” On the one hand, some political elites frame Canadian sovereignty as the capacity of the government to control and defend territorial integrity. On the other hand, some policymakers understand sovereignty in broader terms as the capacity of Canada to act with autonomy and purpose in world affairs. The author finds partisanship and whether members of parliament are affiliated with the government or the opposition to be strong predictors of how elites view Canadian sovereignty. The third chapter, written by Heather Exner-Pirot, analyses the relationship between Indigenous people, with their innovative governance arrangements and political self-determination, and Canadian Arctic sovereignty. The chapter explores the role that Indigenous—and specifically Inuit—rights play in reinforcing or challenging Canadian Arctic sovereignty claims. The author argues for a pan-Arctic sovereignty conceptualization where devolution and Inuit consent are constitutive, and not obstructive, to Canadian sovereignty in the North, and a means to achieve well-being, prosperity, and self-determination. The second arc of the book regroups chapters that address specifically the issue of asserting Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. The fourth chapter, by Kristin Bartenstein, examines the legal dimension of territorial sovereignty. The author argues that a central difficulty of any debate on this topic is the absence of an overarching consensus on key conceptual understanding of issues of sovereignty, especially amongst legal scholars and political scientists. This equivocalness complicates significantly how Canadians discuss sovereignty in the Arctic. In her chapter, the author analyses the legal concept of state sovereignty before moving on to discuss some of the more contentious legal issues of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic, including the uncertainties surrounding Arctic maritime borders, the legal status of the Northwest Passage, and the extent of Canada’s authority over its Arctic waters. Chapter 5, a contribution by political scientist Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, considers the matter of the Arctic seabed and, more specifically, the efforts by Canada to establish coastal state jurisdiction over its extended continental shelf (ECS). The paper makes two arguments. First, she maintains that a traditional concept of state sovereignty remains paramount. Second, contrary to popular perceptions that competition for Arctic resources is causing conflict among sovereign states, the delineation of Arctic ECSs has been marked by high levels of cooperation. The standpoints proposed in the three chapters by Exner-Pirot, Bartenstein, and Riddell-Dixon allow us to better understand the complexity of the political, legal, and economic ramifications of asserting Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic, and reveal the richness of the intellectual debate on the issue. The third arc of the book examines emerging challenges to Canadian sovereignty. Chapter 6, by Frédéric Lasserre, Olga V. Alexeeva, and Lin Yan Huang, assesses the commercial and strategic implications of climate change and, more specifically, how melting sea ice in the Arctic has instigated Chinese interest in the region. Interestingly, China has now developed an Arctic strategy and has described itself as a “near Arctic” state. As such, China appears to have reached some international recognition that it should be involved in the governance of Arctic issues. Furthermore, China has expressed its interest in Arctic’s natural resources and maritime transportation potential. Nevertheless, the authors argue that it does not, in itself, represent a threat to territorial claims by Arctic nations like Canada. The final chapter, written by Colonel Kevin Bryski (Retired), focuses on Canadian sovereignty interest in space. The author considers specifically how the Canadian Armed Forces has expended its responsibility to defend Canada’s sovereignty with key space systems such as GPS, SATCOM, and surveillance from and of space. As the defence policy document Strong, Secure, Engaged, published by the Trudeau government in 2017, clearly stated, Canada needs to invest more resources in order to defend and protect space capabilities. As the author suggests, given the projected global increase in space activity and areas of growing risks, the mission to defend and protect space capabilities will require increased attention. In addition to enhancing capabilities, international efforts must continue to reinforce accepted norms in space to address emerging challenges in a congested, competitive and contested environment. In this respect, the RCAF will remain the key institution responsible for advancing space capabilities to further enhance sovereignty operations in the areas of improved SATCOM availability as well as coverage and enhanced surveillance of and from space. This exercise reflects a willingness of participants from different sectors of Canadian society— academia, private sector, and military—to bridge the gap between theoretical and methodological rigour with policy relevance. It is only through cross-sectoral and interdisciplinary dialogue that we can hope to address such an elusive but pervasive phenomenon as state sovereignty. However, despite such efforts, it appears clear at the conclusion of this project that encouraging and elevating public conversation on Canadian sovereignty will require further collaboration. Readers should see this book as a first step in acknowledging the importance and challenges of sovereignty for Canadians and, hopefully, encourage future work and discussion on the issue.
Time to bring Strategy back to the CBRN Strategy
ZACHARY MYERS
© 2019 FrontLine Defence (Vol 16, No 2)
A Preventative Approach?
The national security landscape in Canada today has become increasingly complex. From terrorism and organized crime to foreign interference and espionage, the security challenges facing Canada are significant. Terrorist attacks are increasingly focused on western interests and, since terrorist organizations have specifically identified Canada as a target in the past, we must consider that future attacks on Canadian soil could include the risk of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) terrorism.
Aimed at enhancing a sustainable resilience to CBRN events, a National CBRN Strategy was developed – through a collaborative, whole-of-government effort – to address the threat of CBRN attacks or accidents. Drafted and published by Public Safety Canada in 2005, then updated in 2011, the Strategy defines the four fundamental components of CBRN resilience as: prevention, preparedness, response and recovery.
In domestic matters involving CBRN threats or accidents, Public Safety Canada facilitates and coordinates the efforts of other government departments, such as National Defence (DND), which operate in supporting roles. Thus, being familiar with the Strategy is beneficial for those military sections tasked with providing support to Public Safety in such events. As a military officer, this was my intention for seeking out the Strategy and related documents.
This article examines how CBRN resilience, as outlined in the current version of the Strategy, is achieved across the agencies, through both domestic and international efforts. It should be noted that Canada’s international efforts typically prioritize the prevention/mitigation pillar of resilience, while domestic concerns often emphasize response and recovery pillars.
Toronto Police and Hazmat team respond to an event. (Photo: Larry Thorne)
As Public Safety Canada is primarily concerned for the safety of the Canadian public, the Strategy appears more as a domestic emergency plan than a comprehensive strategy, with the pillar of response emphasized over prevention.
Based on interviews conducted with members of contributing departments, it becomes evident that, despite Public Safety Canada’s (and therefore the Strategy’s) emphasis on domestic response, the preventative efforts abroad, led by Global Affairs Canada (GAC), appear to be achieving a much greater impact and contributing the most to Canada’s CBRN resilience. This is appropriate as, the more Canada invests in Non-Proliferation (N-P) and Counter-Proliferation (C-P) abroad, the less of a domestic threat CBRN events will be.
Furthermore, as CBRN threats and countermeasures are constantly evolving, the Strategy itself suggests that it be updated every five years. Since the current version was last updated in 2011, it is due for renewal. Specifically, redrafting a strategy that aligns with the Government of Canada’s priorities, resources, and emphasizes prevention over response.
Strategic Action Modified
Originally drafted in 2005, the purpose of the National CBRN Strategy was to provide a policy framework to guide the creation of sustainable capabilities and common standards in CBRN policies, programs, equipment and training across the different contributing departments. It designated the four pillars of CBRN resilience as its strategic objectives and delegated actions to each of the governmental departments involved – giving the guidance on what their main strategic efforts should be in tackling CBRN threats for the following five years.
It further outlined the need for a CBRN Working Group and Committee of Senior Officials Responsible for Emergency Management (SOREM) to be established from Federal, Provincial, and Territorial personnel.
Under the auspices of Public Safety Canada, the SOREM functions as the main coordinating body linking federal and provincial-territorial governments as they develop and carry out programs and initiatives to support the Strategy. This group is also responsible for updating the Strategy, however, the SOREM does not meet on a regular basis. Considering that the Strategy has not been updated since 2011 – a renewal is long overdue.
Between the original (2005) and current (2011) versions, a few notable changes were made. The four original objectives were: Prevention, Preparation, Response, and Recovery. In the 2011 version, these remained as fundamentals in CBRN resilience and critical components of an emergency plan, but were no longer formally designated strategic objectives.
The revised strategic objectives were now: Leadership, Risk Management, Capability-based Planning, Effective and Interoperable Workforce, and Information and Knowledge Management, which focus more on the “how” than on the goals.
The 2011 iteration also removed the listed responsibilities by department – opting instead for a broadly described Action Plan. Implementation of this new Plan, while touching these new objectives, does not clearly specify responsibilities to departments other than Public Safety, nor does it offer any metrics to measure progress in their respective preparatory efforts.
This is concerning, particularly given that the National CBRN Strategy, with its comprehensive aim, requires action from several departments. While Public Safety Canada does not have the authority to mandate another department to action, the plan could suggest which departments would accept certain responsibilities.
These changes in objectives, along with the removal of specific responsibilities, effectively marginalized the original objective of prevention and shifted the focus to emergency response and readiness.
Despite containing a few comments on the importance of prevention, the current version of the Strategy offers very little in the way of guidance for prevention beyond our domestic borders.
Counter-Proliferation Framework Falling Short
In 2018, Public Safety Canada published a document related to the National CBRN Strategy but focusing more on C-P. This document, called “Strengthening Canada’s Counter-Proliferation Framework”, outlines Canada’s current efforts to prevent CBRN threats from occurring within our country. Given C-P’s relevance in bolstering CBRN resilience, it is surprising that the document makes no reference to the Strategy.
The C-P document outlines how Counter-Proliferation has become a subject of concern for both civilians and government officials as Canadian businesses and research institutions are recognized as leaders in many high-tech sectors, from nuclear energy to biotechnology and electronics, which makes Canada a potential target for would-be terrorists or criminals.
It further mentions the roles and responsibilities of several federal departments and how such a multi-departmental framework must be flexible and adaptable to address contemporary challenges, to close gaps, to establish governance structures, and to coordinate activities among those working within them. While these points are important, there is no reference tying any of them to the Strategy’s objectives such as, for instance, building an ‘effective and interoperable workforce’.
On a positive note, this C-P document does speak to the requirements of both an international and domestic component to ensure potential CBRN threats are prevented/mitigated as much as possible. It speaks to Canada’s involvement in several international initiatives and mandates to build global resilience to prevent CBRN proliferation that could threaten our safety and security. This includes Canada’s ongoing efforts to support the Proliferation Security Initiative; the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and INTERPOL.
Canada also supports the full implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, which calls for states to collectively build the capacity of at-risk countries that may require technical, legal, or operational assistance in carrying out C-P activities, specifically against non-state actors.
The document also speaks to Canada’s multi-faceted C-P regime against domestic threats involving various programs and controls, such as the Controlled Goods Program, Human Pathogens and Toxins Act Licensing Program, and export and border controls. All of the efforts and initiatives that Canada is currently involved in, could easily be tied into the current Strategy’s objectives of interoperability, leadership, and capability-based planning, but this C-P document makes no such connection or reference. Nor does it speak to gaps or overlaps between the two documents.
Threat Prevention
Related to CBRN resilience, the WMD Threat Reduction Program (WTRP), as described in the Evergreen Brief (2018) administered by GAC, focuses on CBRN threat prevention and reduction abroad.
By supporting partner countries, international organizations, NGOs and other government departments, the program aims to prevent, detect and respond to a range of threats posed by WMDs by securing and destroying dangerous CBRN materials; protecting and enhancing vulnerable physical infrastructure; strengthening global networks and supporting international initiatives. By participating in these international efforts, Canada can learn the lessons from a greater community of practice and these can and should then be integrated into our own domestic planning and training.
Notable examples of the fulfillment of Canadian commitments can be found in the Nuclear Security Summit process (2012, 2016), the Global Health Security Agenda, and the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.
The Global Partnership was originally established in 2002 as a $20B international initiative to prevent terrorists and “states of proliferation concern” from acquiring WMDs. Since then, Canada’s WTRP has supported it with $1.3B in projects (approximately $73.4 million per year). Canada assumed the Chair of the Global Partnership Working Group in 2018, hosting two meetings during that year.
Key priorities of the WTRP are: nuclear/radiological security; biological security; chemical weapon reduction and security; and UNSCR 1540 implementation. The nuclear and radiological security program has had some notable payoffs through the WTRP. For instance, strengthening the capabilities to prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radiological materials in Jordan, increased capabilities to detect and interdict illicit cargo of radiological materials in Latin America and the Caribbean, and assistance in the creation of radiological disposal systems in Ghana, the Philippines and Malaysia.
Similarly, through its biological security programming, Canada has lent its support to the biosecurity response of the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone, enhanced biosecurity capacities in Jordan, and continues to financially support international collaborations such as the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations and the World Health Organization’s own Biological Threat Reduction Program.
As part of its chemical threat and security programming, Canada has supported the OPCW-UN Joint Investigation Mechanism to attribute responsibility for Chemical Weapons attacks in Syria, and support to the investigation, monitoring, and destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons.
And through its UNSCR 1540 Implementation programming, Canada has supported United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime Container Control Program in SE Asia to enhance detection and interdiction capacities at ports to prevent illicit trafficking of CBRN material and weapons. Additionally, Canada’s National CBRN Response Team has been delivering CBRN training to first responders in Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia, Jordan, and Malaysia.
With its multiple lines of programming, the WTRP has produced several measurable effects in reducing CBRN-related threats worldwide, which undoubtedly serves Canada in mitigating if not preventing the likelihood of responding to a CBRN threat domestically.
Recommendations for Renewing the Strategy
Comparing these documents in how they promote CBRN resilience both domestically and abroad, it becomes clear that the current National CBRN Strategy has reduced the emphasis on strategic “resiliency through prevention” in favour of greater emphasis on interoperability and effective planning of domestic responses across the federal and provincial levels of government. Although the C-P framework also maintains that emphasis on domestic activities over international activities, it does refer to building CBRN resilience through mitigation and prevention.
At the other end of the spectrum, the WTRP, as a program administered through GAC, focuses solely on building CBRN resilience through prevention abroad.
The current Action Plan and Strategy function as a broad set of guidelines to encourage preparation and an interoperable response to a domestic CBRN event. As the Strategy is well overdue for renewal, it would be prudent to consider the following assessment.
Clearly outlining responsibilities in the prevention, response, or recovery from a CBRN event within or outside of Canada – as the 2005 version set out – would allow each department to measure its own effectiveness. In doing so, it will avoid the gaps that currently exist.
A greater emphasis should be placed on preventative C-P efforts, both domestically and abroad. For this, staff within Public Safety Canada must communicate with each other more effectively to make sure all the necessary points are covered in one comprehensive document. Perhaps another annex could be incorporated, with a secondary Action Plan pertaining directly to preventative efforts. Incorporating this would give the revised Strategy a more balanced structure between the needs for both prevention and response in sustaining resilience. Furthermore, the SOREM would have to ensure that the revised Strategy is resourced and implemented accordingly, which is a current point of concern.
During interviews with members from several of the contributing departments, differing interpretations of the Strategy, its Action Plan, and the SOREM began to emerge. For instance, while corresponding with a military officer embedded in the Governmental Operations Centre (administered by Public Safety), he noted that the Strategy does not contain a standardized federal business plan for CBRN training across the country – such training is left to the individual departments. Each region/province has mandates to deal with CBRN incidents, but this amounts to ensuring the respective companies of interest (i.e. chemical and nuclear plants) have standing contracts in place with civilian companies specialized in containing and/or responding to facilities disasters (and not necessarily to include humanitarian aid response). Interoperability exercises are often orchestrated through the initiative of particular departments rather than by Public Safety Canada. The reality on the ground does not suggest a particularly strong commitment to the interoperability outlined in the Strategy. In short, should a CBRN event occur domestically, Public Safety Canada will activate its agencies and notify the provinces, as will the other governmental departments to address the crisis. That seems to be the full extent of national preparation.
The truth is, despite the pointed language of the Strategy and the addition of the Action Plan Annex, very little of what’s written therein seems to be currently being enacted. This raises questions about the role of the SOREM.
Should Public Safety Canada decide to make good on its claim that the Strategy is to be updated in the near future, it could implement the changes suggested above. To do so, it is incumbent upon its leaders – through the aid and direction of the SOREM – to plan for, allot resources to, and inform OGDs of the Strategic objectives it intends to actualize. Or it could take a much more honest approach to what it realistically expects to achieve, and forego any attempt to include details or actions it is not capable of implementing or measuring.
Summary and Conclusion
Reviewing and comparing the National CBRN Strategy with other related documents reveals conflicting points of alignment that have emerged within Canada’s general approach to CBRN resilience. These friction points can provide Public Safety with material and recommendations for revisions as the time for the Strategy’s renewal is due.
Key points to promote in this upcoming Strategic revision are to: (a) return to the format of the original CBRN Strategy, at least ‘suggesting’ responsibilities for each of the contributing departments and agencies; and (b) place a greater emphasis on prevention, even to the point of annexing a secondary Action Plan to focus on measures pertaining to Counter-Proliferation.
For the Strategy to have any pertinence as a comprehensive document, the revised version must be more balanced in its structure between the needs for prevention and response in sustaining CBRN resilience. It must also be resourced and communicated to the OGDs accordingly.
It is important to consider that while CBRN attacks are potentially devastating, they are also a low-probability risk within Canada (partly due to preventative efforts, domestically and abroad). This, along with the government’s finite resources, may be the reason that implementing the current Strategy and Action Plan has not been tenable. If resources are sufficiently scarce to forego business planning for preparing for such events as outlined in the Strategy (i.e. interoperability training events between departments), that perhaps is informative in its own right. It is upon the government to manage this risk, but this too should be captured in the National CBRN Strategy’s next edition.
– Zac Myers is an officer in the Canadian Armed Forces. The opinions expressed in this article reflect the views of the author alone and not those of any organization.
Andrea Charron: Canada’s UN submission will (eventually) draw the last lines on the map
In May 2019, Canada made a partial submission to the United Nations to recognize an extended continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in the Arctic Ocean. This means that Canada will soon have the last lines drawn on the map of Canada.
Canada’s submission was made to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) under Article 76 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
There was surprisingly little fanfare over this extraordinary accomplishment in a week of maritime-related accomplishments that included Canada acceding to an international moratorium to prevent unregulated commercial fishing in the central Arctic Ocean.
As a political scientist, I want to understand the processes used, the states involved and the international organizations and law that guided this extraordinary example of global governance.
This video, from Fisheries and Oceans Canada, outlines how the government measures and defines land that is hidden deep under water or ice.
Shelf’s edge
First, what is the continental shelf? Imagine you are standing on an ocean beach. You decide to keep walking for as long as you can feel ground beneath your feet. This ground is the seabed and subsoil, and coastal states have inherent right to explore and exploit the natural resources.
According to UNCLOS, this does not depend upon occupation or an express proclamation; in other words, Canada need not provide any justification. And if the coastal state can provide evidence that its continental shelf extends beyond 200 nautical miles — the outer continental shelf — Canada can explore and extract mineral and other non-living resources from the seabed and subsoil.
An illustration showing the zones as pertaining to the limits of a state’s jurisdiction. UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea
Canada’s partial submission to the CLCS, which includes written explanations and physical evidence, was led by branches of the federal government: Global Affairs Canada, Geological Survey of Canada and the Canadian Hydrographic Service.
There was also extensive assistance and participation by various Indigenous groups, Canada’s territorial governments, Parks Canada, the Canadian Ice Service, the Canadian Coast Guard, Defence Research and Development Canada and the Department of National Defence.
Collecting information
Collecting data in the Arctic is extremely difficult and costly. It is only possible to navigate the Arctic in the summer months, and even then, the perennial ice coverage and weather, wind and current conditions pose challenges.
Data collected for Canada’s submission included bathymetric, gravimetric, seismic, areo-gravity and areo-metric information. Retrieving 800 kg of rock samples and three piston cores involves engineering and scientific feats of marvel, bravery and sheer determination.
Considering Canada had more rock samples from the moon than from the Arctic, it is a reminder of how little is known about the Arctic. Imagine, therefore, the scientific breakthroughs Canada and the world have yet to discover with this data especially now that government scientists helping with Canada’s submission are now at liberty to publish their findings in academic journals.
Collaboration and geopolitics
Canada’s submission was aided by collaboration with the governments of Denmark, Sweden (and especially its icebreaker Oden), the U.S. and Germany.
The Arctic Ocean is surrounded by five coastal states: Canada, Russia, the U.S., Denmark (via Greenland and the Faroe Islands) and Norway. It was anticipated by all of the Arctic states that Russia, the U.S., Canada and Denmark, by virtue of their adjacent and opposite locations, could have overlapping claims.
A map of the Arctic Ocean, showing the surrounding countries. Shutterstock
It was expected that all four would collect data from at least some of the same areas of extended continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. Russia, Denmark and Canada have all made at least partial submissions to the CLCS which will review the scientific evidence and provide technical feedback regarding the scientific integrity of the data provided.
The CLCS cannot reconcile overlapping claims. Annex 1 of the CLSC’s rules of procedure notes that “matters regarding disputes which may arise in connection with the establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf rests with States.”
Establishing boundaries
Canada, Russia, Denmark and the U.S. are expected to continue to negotiate, as they will have the final say in determining the extent of the boundaries. This means Canada has years to wait before the process is completed, and there are a few caveats to keep in mind.
First, given the highly technical nature of the evidence and the few number of commission members, Canada’s submission is not expected to be fully reviewed by the CLCS for many years. Canada’s Arctic submission is currently number 84 on the CLCS’ list.
Second, the U.S. is not a party to UNCLOS although it does treat much of it, including Article 76, as customary law (meaning the U.S. agrees to the outlined principles). The U.S. has an active Extended Continental Shelf program and the government is collecting data in anticipation of ongoing negotiations.
Third, there is no time crunch for the resources of the extended continental shelf given the distance, cost and difficulties to access them. Many tend to assume that resources do exist for exploitation, but it could also be that there is nothing of commercial worth available.
Fourth, any resources and activity within the water and airspace beyond 200 nautical miles from the coastal baseline belongs to everyone and is governed by international law.
Finally, there are limitations in UNCLOS on the extent of the continental shelf and Article 82 of UNCLOS provides for a system of revenue sharing by means of payments or contributions in kind with respect to the extraction of non-living resources of the continental shelf lying beyond 200 nautical miles. Given the small size of the Arctic Ocean, however, most of it is already captured within the Arctic coastal states’ exclusive economic zones.
Canada’s Executive Summary submission is available for anyone to review. Despite the complexity of the data, the submission is very readable and excellent scholarship. This reflects the extraordinary work of Canada’s scientists and civil servants, and is an example of global governance working well.
