Knocking NATO: Strategic and institutional challenges risk the future of Europe’s seven-decade cold peace
A joint Policy Paper from The School of Public Policy and the Canadian Global Affairs Institute
by Anessa L. Kimball
Abstract
Despite providing European stability through collective defence and crisis management in an exclusive club, NATO faces persistent challenges from strategic insecurities complicated by recent institutional uncertainties. The club’s structure permits several goods-producing schemes, depending on how individual contributions combine, the qualities associated with a good’s publicness (i.e., its possible substitutes or how it excludes benefits from non-members) and partner differences in capacity and willingness. NATO faces challenges from Russia ranging from cybersecurity and media manipulation to overt and covert military pressures. Recent deployments sink costs and tie hands, reassuring commitment credibility, and are essential given the uncertainty generated from U.S. President Donald Trump’s ambiguous commitment to Article 5, compounded with the effects of Brexit on alliance politics and burden-sharing. Given the conjunction of strategic insecurities and institutional uncertainties, it is convenient to knock NATO, but rational institutionalist theory (RIT) is optimistic. RIT argues that the club’s design permits strategic adaptation to new contexts and insecurities, but partners must signal commitment credibly to prevent uncertainties about cohesion. RIT favoured enlargement to shift burdens, and data confirm that the Americans, British and Germans shifted burdens to others, including Canada. Moreover, any alternative to NATO is costly for less-endowed partners facing direct defence pressures. Canada’s role as a broker of compromise and its willingness to make its commitments credible places it in future missions, regardless. Canadian leadership in reassuring and socializing new partners in Operation Reassurance offers an opportunity to retain its objective and subjective position as a key partner.
Foreign Policy in a Minority Parliament
Steve Saideman appears as a guest on The Agenda with Steve Paikin:
https://www.tvo.org/video/foreign-policy-in-a-minority-parliament
WIIS - Canada is looking for an Executive Director & Board Members
Desired Candidate
Women in International Security (WIIS) Canada is looking for a dynamic and motivated individual based anywhere in Canada, to serve in support of the Board of Directors as Executive Director. This is a voluntary position requiring approximately 5 hours per week. In time we aim to raise sufficient structural funding to provide some renumeration.
Requirements and Qualifications:
Academic credentials in international development, business, law, political science, security, policy, journalism or communication
A demonstrated affiliation with or interest in issues of national and international peace and security
Demonstrated ability to work in both official languages of Canada, English and French
Solid team work skills
Description of Executive Director’s Role:
The Executive Director serves on the Board in an ex officio capacity. Duties include but are not limited to:
Implementation of the Corporation’s strategic direction and programs
General supervision of the day-to-day affairs (this includes management of financials and the membership base, communication with members, external communications)
Ultimate responsibility for management of the website and social media platforms
Ensure that for all activities and partnerships, the WIIS-Canada brand is visible and well
Strategic decision and events involving the WIIS-Canada brand must be submitted to the Board for
The ED will have other duties as the Board may specify.
Core topics of engagement and expertise:
Female leadership building
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security
Sexual and gender-based violence
Canada’s role in the security and defence sector
WIIS-Canada will be accepting applications until October 9.
To apply, please submit resume and covering letter to the Interim Executive Director, Dr. Cassandra Steer: executivedirector@wiiscanada.org
To nominate yourself or any WIIS-Canada member for the Board elections, fill out this form: https://forms.gle/yCve6ELLRuAW5SKB9
Rediscovering the Cost of Deterrence
CGAI POLICY PERSPECTIVE
by Andrea Charron, CGAI Fellow and James Fergusson
September 2019
The Canada-U.S. Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) held its 238th meeting in Ottawa this June. Established in 1940, the PJBD1 was created to provide study and recommendations to the governments of both Canada and the United States for the joint defence of “the north half of the Western hemisphere”. Of late, there has been more discussion than recommendations. The civilian co-chairs (currently, Canadian MP John McKay and retired U.S. Lt.-Gen. Chris Miller) and the other members are grappling with increasing geopolitical tension and great power competition. They are rediscovering the importance of deterrence and of defending North America – not unlike the original co-chairs in 1940 or, 40 years later, their fellow co-chairs during the Cold War. Now, as was the case in the 1980s, is the time to reinvest in the defence of Canada and the United States even though competing priorities and elections make it particularly difficult.
One solution to increased tensions in the 1980s was the PJBD’s decision to recommend a North American Air Defence Modernization (NAADM) program, which involved, among other things,2 upgrading the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line constructed in 1954. This series of manned radar stations that began in Alaska and stretched across the Canadian archipelago to Labrador needed upgrading. It had to meet the new threat posed by the development and deployment of long-range, air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) carried by a new generation of Soviet bombers. As the trip wire to detect air-breathing threats emanating from the northern approaches to North America, the DEW Line needed to see farther north and with greater acuity. It had to identify, track and direct NORAD fighters to intercept incoming Soviet bombers before they could launch their cruise missiles. While an upgraded DEW Line was central to the air defence of North America, it was also a key component in deterring a Soviet attack, and thus in the overarching Western strategy of deterrence to prevent a nuclear war.
The DEW Line was an incredible undertaking of its time. It required more than a half-million tonnes of material, enough gravel to build a road from Vancouver to Halifax, and 25,000 construction workers. It cost $350 million – a large sum for the 1950s.3 The modernization of the DEW Line with the unmanned North Warning System (NWS) cost well over $1 billion at the time and was completed just when the Soviet Union collapsed.
One might easily conclude that all of this was an enormous financial and environmental expense for nothing. The Soviet Union did not attack North America and the contribution of the DEW Line and its replacement, the NWS, in deterring such an attack is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to measure. Indeed, there is no definitive answer as to whether or not deterrence prevented a third world war. One cannot measure a non-event. Rather, one can only know when deterrence fails.
The problem is a relatively simple, yet extremely complicated one. Deterrence is not just a mathematical calculation involving the number of military assets. Intentions are as important a consideration, if not more so, although capabilities and intentions are not easily, if ever, fully measurable. Nonetheless, the evidence from the Cold War strongly suggests that demonstrating a credible defence, which always comes at a considerable cost, is part of the calculus. The decision to upgrade the DEW Line is an example of that cost which may or may not have tipped the balance of intentions for the Soviet Union’s leaders. At a minimum, Soviet strategic calculations could not have ignored the NWS as part of the broader U.S.-led Western policy of strategic deterrence that extended into NATO Europe.
Tense geopolitical times have now returned. Great power politics are dominant once again, and the actual intentions of Russia or China remain open to debate. It is no secret that the NWS is reaching the end of its serviceable life. If NORAD is to continue to contribute to North America’s defence, and to strategic deterrence, it must be modernized. As in the case of the DEW Line and its successor, the NWS, a new generation of advanced Russian and Chinese ALCMs, along with other new military technologies, dictates a major overhaul of North America’s continental defence. Failing to do so will leave Canada and the United States vulnerable to attack, creating a significant gap in the West’s deterrence posture, which adversaries will exploit politically and possibly militarily.
The price tag for a revitalized defence of Canada and the United States will be considerable. Rather than just a land-based radar system, the NWS replacement alone will require a system-of-systems solution, likely entailing space, air, cyber- and land-based assets, and possibly naval as well, with the goal of ensuring all-domain awareness. To be effective, it will have to be combined with new systems for communications, command and control, particularly in the North, as well as new capabilities to detect, engage and defeat drones, missiles and aircraft which will also require a rethink of forward operating locations. Especially in Canada, critics will emerge to suggest not only that it is a waste of money, but that it will also contribute to increased tensions. However, there is little doubt that the U.S. – regardless of who is president or which party holds the balance of power in Congress after the 2020 elections – will spend considerable amounts to ensure homeland defence. For example, the U.S. has already spent more on one element of its homeland defence, the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) against ballistic missiles, than the entire Canadian defence budget. Indeed, Canada and the U.S. have already agreed to share the costs of NWS modernization and replacement as per the terms of reference.4
It is highly unlikely that the issues of North American defence, NORAD modernization and NWS replacement will receive much, if any, attention in the fall federal election. The two primary competitors for government, the Liberals and Conservatives, generally agree on the need to modernize NORAD and replace the NWS. The Liberals are committed through the 2017 defence white paper, Strong, Secure, Engaged, even though no specific funding envelope exists to meet Canada’s obligation. The Conservatives have long portrayed themselves as pro-defence, but may be more interested in calling for NORAD modernization and NWS replacement than in funding it.
The only election wildcards are the NDP and Greens. While neither is likely to make NORAD and NWS an election issue, a Liberal minority government dependent on either or both of these parties could well pose a block to NORAD and NWS funding. Both will likely be at ideological odds with the costs and implications of NORAD modernization and NWS replacement.
Of course, a bigger worry is if the U.S. demands more funding from Canada and/or is unsatisfied with Canada’s general military contributions vis-à-vis homeland defence and therefore presses for more resources and compromises from Ottawa. To date, Washington and more accurately, senior U.S. military leaders have recognized and accepted Canadian financial and political constraints. Saying no to the U.S. midcourse ballistic missile defence system and contributing limited numbers of Canadian aircraft and personnel to NORAD, as examples, have been taken in stride. But the current president’s homeland-first stance at seemingly all costs, and growing attention to the borders (especially the Mexico/U.S. border) could put Canada in a more difficult position. On the one hand, NORAD has nothing to do with securing the U.S. southern border – while USNORTHCOM, NORAD’s twin American command, has been deployed there to provide defence support to the civil authorities. On the other hand, NORAD is essential to monitoring the air and maritime approaches to both Canada and the United States. If the U.S. is unsatisfied with Canadian participation in NORAD or requires more financial support to modernize it and replace the NWS, Canada will be in a politically difficult position. The U.S. and Canada at odds is a gift for would-be adversaries. And lest one thinks this applies only to the current administration, think again. Considering the changing geopolitics and growing capabilities of near-peer competitors, U.S. homeland defence as a national imperative is here to stay regardless of which party is in power.
It could very well be that like the DEW Line upgrade, a modernized NORAD and NWS will precede a new era of detente. Many will argue the money spent was wasted – it could have been put to really important health and education initiatives. This line of argument is exactly what we hope for. It means an adversary was, or adversaries were, deterred. Deterrence, however, is not possible without spending on capabilities, training, hardware, software and personnel. Deterrence is also about supporting allies – especially Canada’s most important ally. Therefore, when one considers simply the cost of NORAD modernization and NWS replacement, one discounts the many nuances of deterrence.
The weird, telling Joe Biden debate moment that didn’t get enough attention
His Iraq and Afghanistan answer raises some serious questions about his fitness for office.
By Zack Beauchamp@zackbeauchampzack@vox.com Sep 13, 2019, 2:10pm EDT
Repeated on-stage jabs at former Vice President Joe Biden from former US housing secretary Julián Castro at Thursday night’s Democratic debate, paired with a bizarre and vaguely offensive Biden monologue about record players in response to a question about on race, made the question of Biden’s mental fitness for office impossible to ignore.
It’s an awkward topic that can easily verge into outright ageism. But Biden sounds sloppier and less put together than the other two frontrunners from his age bracket, Sens. Bernie Sanders (78) and Elizabeth Warren (70). He’s always been gaffe-prone, to be sure, but something about it feels worse now to a lot of Democratic voters.
The Castro attack — “Are you forgetting what you said two minutes ago?” — and the “record player” answer got the most attention. (Castro denied he was talking about Biden’s age.) But another Biden moment also raised red flags: His response to a question about the Obama administration’s withdrawal from Iraq.
Biden played a role in implementing the withdrawal, and thus should be able to speak knowledgeably about it. But his answer, which discussed both Iraq and the war in Afghanistan, made very little sense overall.
Foreign policy is supposed to be one of Biden’s clear areas of competence, a policy area he’s focused on throughout his career. The fact that he stumbled so badly should raise serious questions about his presidential bid.
Biden’s Iraq jumble
The question began when ABC’s David Muir asked Biden: “Was it wrong to pull out of Iraq that quickly? And did the move actually help ISIS take hold?”
It’s a misleading question — Obama’s approach to withdrawal was not the reason for ISIS’s rise — and should have allowed Biden to go on offense, defending the last president’s record on an important foreign policy issue.
But that’s not what happened. After asserting that the withdrawal wasn’t a mistake, Biden instead talked for a bit about his support for the initial invasion of Iraq back in the Bush administration. This seems like a reference to a recent controversy about Biden falsely saying he opposed the invasion “immediately,” but that wasn’t brought up Muir nor clearly explained by Biden:
With regard to — with regard to Iraq, the fact of the matter is that, you know, I should have never voted to give Bush the authority to go in and do what he said he was going to do. The AUMF was designed, he said, to go in and get the Security Council to vote 15-0 to allow inspectors to go in to determine whether or not anything was being done with chemical weapons or nuclear weapons. And when that happened, he went ahead and went anyway without any of that proof.
I said something that was not meant the way I said it.
I said — from that point on — what I was argued against in the beginning, once he started to put the troops in, was that in fact we were doing it the wrong way; there was no plan; we should not be engaged; we didn’t have the people with us; we didn’t have our — we didn’t have allies with us, et cetera.
The answer itself is confusing, obscuring the fact that he spent at least a year defending the decision to invade Iraq before he turned on the war.
Things get weirder when Biden gets to the actual meat of the question, about whether the Obama Iraq withdrawal was a mistake. He offered two short paragraphs — one recounting his role running Iraq policy under Obama, and a second that frankly makes no sense:
It was later, when we came into office, that Barack turned — the president turned to me and said, ‘Joe’ — when they said we’ve got a plan to get out, he turned to the whole security and said, ‘Joe will organize this. Get the troops home.’
My son spent a year in Iraq, and I understand. It made — and we were right to get the combat troops out. The big mistake that was made, which we predicted, was that you would not have a circumstance where the Shia and the Kurds would work together to keep ISIS from coming — from moving in.
I’ve spent a while pondering this last line — “the big mistake that was made, which we predicted, was that you would not have a circumstance where the Shia and Kurds would work together to keep ISIS from coming” — and I can’t make heads or tails of it.
The Shia majority and ethnic Kurdish minority are ISIS’s bitter enemies, given that ISIS is a Sunni jihadist group. I think Biden is trying to say that they should have cooperated on counter-ISIS efforts between 2011 and 2014, but didn’t. But lack of Kurdish-Shia coordination isn’t really what led to the rise of ISIS in Iraq (there were a lot of other causes).
Moreover, Biden’s answer suggests that someone other than the Kurds and Shia made a “big mistake” in judgment. I’m having a hard time understanding the substance of the supposed mistake, who in particular made it, what the consequences were, or why, if it “we” (presumably the Obama administration) predicted it, that it wasn’t stopped.
The overall impression was of Biden just saying some Iraq-related things that either didn’t address the question or were literally incoherent. And this is a policy area he specialized in, both during his time in the Senate during the Bush administration and as Obama’s vice president.
Biden’s Afghanistan jumble
But Biden’s answer to Muir’s question wasn’t just about Iraq. He wanted to talk about Afghanistan policy, a major issue on the debate stage, and so redirected some of his time to that particular issue.
Candidates change the subject during debates all the time. But the substance of what Biden said about Afghanistan was kind of confusing. Here’s the first half:
I’ve been in and out of Afghanistan, not with a gun, and I admire my friend [Pete Buttigieg] for his service. But I’ve been out of Afghanistan I think more than anybody on this — and it’s an open secret, you reported a long time ago, George, that I was opposed to the surge in Afghanistan.
The whole purpose of going to Afghanistan was to not have a counterinsurgency, meaning that we’re going to put that country together. It cannot be put together. Let me say it again. It will not be put together. It’s three different countries. Pakistan owns the three counties — the three provinces in the east. They’re not any part of -- the Haqqanis run it. I will go on and on.
This answer struck me as a bit strange. Not just verbally, in terms of shifting between “countries” and “counties” and “provinces,” but substantively — the idea that Afghanistan is actually three distinct countries that cannot be meaningfully united.
Afghanistan does have three major geographic regions, but it’s not clear how politically important those geographic distinctions are. My impression was not very — there are not major separatist impulses in Afghanistan divided by geographic region — but I’m not an expert.
So I turned to someone who is: Steve Saideman, the Paterson chair of international affairs at Carleton University and the author of two books on the war in Afghanistan. He was as befuddled as I was.
“When talking about Afghanistan and reaching an agreement, I have never heard anyone refer to three regions,” Saideman told me. “While federalism will probably play a role, the numbers there are around 30 or so for all of the provinces, not three.”
It’s possible Biden instead mixed up two countries: “Biden might have confused Afghanistan with Iraq,” Saideman suggested.
In the 2000s, Biden proposed a plan for splitting Iraq up into three distinct federal regions along ethno-religious lines — semi-autonomous Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish regions. This is not a very good idea, and it didn’t catch on with Iraqis. But least it tracked with the politically salient sectarian divisions in the country, which it doesn’t with Afghanistan.
The second half of Biden’s answer was perfectly cogent, aside from a questionably feasible proposal to force Pakistan to accept US troop basing in its borders. Biden is arguing that the US needs to cut down its troop presence and focus more narrowly on fighting potential terrorist threats to the US homeland rather than the overall Taliban insurgency — a defensible position that, as Biden’s notes, he’s been advocating since the Obama administration:
But here’s the point. The point is that it’s a counterterrorism strategy. We can prevent the United States from being the victim of terror coming out of Afghanistan by providing for bases — insist the Pakistanis provide bases for us to air lift from and to move against what we know.
We don’t need those troops there. I would bring them home. And [Joint Chiefs Chair] Joe Dunford’s a fine guy, but this has been an internal argument we’ve had for eight years.
But the “three countries” gibberish overshadowed the more sensible part of the answer. Why is Biden seemingly porting over dubious concepts from Iraq to another conflict entirely? Why were major portions of his answers on both Iraq and Afghanistan so deeply flawed? Why did he perform so poorly in this area of alleged competence?
These are worrying questions, and ones that even Democratic-leaning experts are starting to ask: “If Warren gave Biden’s answer on Afghanistan, she would be eviscerated,” Max Bergmann, former State Department official and a senior fellow at the center-left Center for American Progress, tweeted during the debate.
Improving Election Night Media Coverage
During elections, the Canadian news media often falls short when explaining government and what happens after the votes are in.
Policy Options Magazine
Canada’s system of government isn’t easy to understand. As a parliamentary democracy and constitutional monarchy that relies on rules that have evolved over hundreds of years, the intricacies of our system aren’t obvious and can sometimes seem bizarre. Most people, for instance, probably couldn’t tell you what purpose the Crown serves or how constitutional conventions differ from constitutional law. And frankly, that’s ok. Canadians don’t need to know the finer points of Westminster parliamentarism to be informed and engaged in politics. What they should be comfortable with are the constitutional basics, such as who gets to govern and why.
Many Canadians rely on the news media to provide them with these fundamentals. Unfortunately, the media often falls short when explaining how Canadian government works. There is no one reason why this is the case, though imported American lingo and folk theories of democracy play into it. Election night reporting, in particular, often distorts the essential features of our system. This can have nefarious effects over the longer term and in particular cases. Without asking every anchor, reporter, and editor to become an insufferable pedant (we academics already have that covered), there are a few simple ways to improve how the media presents things on election night.
When a political party is projected to have gained a clear and obvious majority of seats in the House of Commons, networks will announce that it has won a “majority government.” This isn’t a perfect description, but it’s understandable. Given Canada’s tight party discipline, the leader of the caucus holding a majority of seats will have significant control of the House of Commons as prime minister.
Problems arise when no single party has a majority of seats. The party that has the most seats will usually serve as the government, but not always. Declaring that one of the parties has won a “minority government” presents this result as a forgone conclusion, when other arrangements are possible. Notably, the party with the second-most seats might try to govern with the help of the third or fourth parties, as happened in British Columbia. What matters is who can carry a majority of votes in the House of Commons, not who has the most seats.
Equally important, pronouncing that the party with the most seats has “won” a minority government suggests that alternative arrangements with third- or fourth-place parties are less legitimate. If the party with the most seats is the winner, does that mean the other parties are all losers? Not when the smaller parties can together hold the confidence of the Commons. This type of language of winners and losers doesn’t fit with a parliamentary system and shouldn’t be encouraged. It distorts how our democracy works and fuels harmful, erroneous rhetoric.
So, what should media do and say instead? Going with the language of majority and minority “parliaments” would be a start. It wouldn’t prevent discussions about who would govern in a majority; it’s not hard to say, “so and so will be prime minister” in a “majority parliament.” Or, when no party has a majority, it should be enough to say that the election has produced a minority parliament. If the prime minister resigns on election night after a poor showing at the polls, then it will also be pretty clear who will be the next prime minister. If, however, the prime minister doesn’t resign on election night, then it should be enough to state that there’s a minority parliament and the current government will try to stay in power, as Brian Gallant attempted in New Brunswick last year.
The importance of the prime minister’s resignation, or lack thereof, speaks to another regrettable tendency: talk of electing a prime minister. People often vote for a party based on the leader. Campaigns centre around leaders. There’s no sense in denying that our elections are focused on leaders above parties. But that doesn’t change the fact that we elect members of Parliament, while the prime minister is appointed. Here again, this may not matter much when a party has a majority of seats. Yet it can have an impact when a prime minister tries to govern even if his or her party doesn’t have the most seats, or if there’s a change of government within a single parliament, as can happen in the early months of a minority.
Prime ministers can also resign and be replaced by another member of their party during a majority. Kim Campbell and Paul Martin are recent examples. While people may vote based on who they want as prime minister, talking about the election of the prime minister is an unhelpful distortion of our system.
Talk of a “prime minister-elect” is wrong, too. This is an obvious borrowing of American terminology that isn’t applicable in Canada. A prime minister who stays on after an election simply remains prime minister. There’s no transition of power in these cases. Indeed, they don’t even need to “form” a new government. They simply remain the head of their current government. When the prime minister resigns, the new prime minister will be appointed by the governor general. The correct title for that individual during the transition is “prime minister-designate,” which signals that person has been designated to form a new government. However, the designate title should only be applied after a leader has been commissioned by the governor general, particularly if the election results aren’t clear and the incumbent prime minister hasn’t resigned.
There other terms the media should avoid. For example, talking about a government’s “mandate” doesn’t make much sense if a party has won less than 50 percent of the popular vote; furthermore, research shows that the electorate rarely votes for particular policies, let alone an entire platform. It’s also not clear why we started inserting the prefix “sitting” when talking about cabinet ministers (that is, they serve as ministers, sit as parliamentarians.) But these are relatively minor quibbles. If we fix how we speak about majorities, minorities, and how prime ministers attain their office, that will be a significant, and important, improvement.
This article is part of The media and Canadian elections special feature.
Photo: A crowd of Liberal Party supporters watch as Justin Trudeau makes his victory speech at pub in Vancouver at a Liberal election night party, on October 19, 2015. (John Lehmann/The Globe and Mail)
Ottawa Today with Mark Sutcliffe
Stephen Saideman with the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University & Director of the Canadian Defence and Security Network
